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The Internet reduces the cost of exchanging information. Electronic markets exploit this opportu-
nity to enable investors to place quotes at very little cost and compete with incumbent trading systems.
Does this quasi–free entry situation lead to competitive liquidity supply? We analyze trades and order
placement on Nasdaq and a competing electronic order book, Island. While Island traders often un-
dercut Nasdaq quotes, they undercut each other much less frequently. The coarse tick size prevailing
on Nasdaq in 2000 was considerably reduced in 2001, while the Island tick remained very thin. This
resulted in tighter spreads onbothmarkets. These findings are inconsistent with the perfect compe-
tition hypothesis, under which Island traders should undercut each others as much as Nasdaq quotes,
and quote zero-profits spreads, unaffected by a drop in the Nasdaq tick. We also estimate and test
a theoretical model of competition in limit orders, and find that Island limit orders earned rents in
2000, but not in 2001. Our findings suggest that perfect competition cannot be taken for granted, even
in modern financial markets, and that competition among markets complements competition among
traders.
Imperfect competition in financial markets:
ISLAND vs NASDAQ
1 Introduction
Internet technology reduces communication and information processing costs. In turn, this reduces the cost of
entry in financial markets. Thus, new market mechanisms can be created and compete with incumbent trading
systems, and a larger population of investors and traders can access the market. In conjunction with this techno-
logical revolution, the regulatory change brought about by the 1997 SEC order display rule enhanced the ability
of investors to post offers to trade stocks in the market. Electronic Communication Networks (hereafter ECNs)
developed to exploit these opportunities. These changes in the structure of the market should foster competition to
supply liquidity.
To study this point we focus on Island, one of the largest ECNs, which amounted to nearly 10% of the trading
volume in Nasdaq stocks in 2002.4 Island is operated as a fully transparent electronic limit order market, where
all investors can anonymously post quotes. Its book is freely observable to all on the web in real time. Accessing
this market is very inexpensive. In fact, Island grants a small rebate to limit orders when they are hit, to reward
liquidity supply. We study the extent to which these features of the market foster competitive liquidity supply.
Stigler (1957) lists five conditions under which perfect competition obtains according to Adam Smith: “1)
The rivals must act independently, not collusively. 2) The number of rivals, potential as well as present, must
be sufficient to eliminate extraordinary gains. 3) The economic units possess tolerable knowledge of the market
opportunities. 4) There must be freedom to act on this knowledge. 5) Sufficient time must elapse for resources to
flow in the directions and quantities desired by their owners.” Imperfect competition in financial markets has been
documented when these conditions are violated, as small groups of financial intermediaries have privileged access
to information collection and dissemination (see e.g., Christie and Schultz, 1994, or Chen and Ritter, 2000). Such
violations are less likely on Island. Stigler’s conditions 1) and 2) could hold on Island since there is open access to
the market to many investors via the web. Also, the remarkable transparency of Island should ensure that condition
3) is satisfied. The 1997 Order Handling Rule emphasized investors’ right to place orders, hence condition 4)
should hold also. Thus, after sufficient time (as required by condition 5), traders should devote resources to supply
liquidity on Island, until a competitive situation is reached.
4Island recently merged with Instinet, but its market model has not been altered.
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We test the hypothesis that liquidity supply on Island is competitive. We empirically analyze the strategies fol-
lowed by liquidity suppliers on Island. We test if limit orders on Island are consistent with free-entry equilibrium,
in line with the theoretical analysis of electronic order books by Glosten (1994). We also aim to shed light on the
competition between Island, a relatively recent electronic marketplace, and the incumbent market, Nasdaq. Thus
we tackle competition among liquidity suppliers within one trading mechanismandcompetition between trading
mechanisms.
Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the difference in the pricing grids used in these two market places
and of their changes. Before April 2001, the pricing grid on Nasdaq was relatively coarse, as the tick size was
one-sixteenth, and quite thin on Island, where the tick size was 1/256. In April 2001, the Nasdaq pricing grid
was decimalized. Prices on Nasdaq are now quoted in cents. At the same time the Island tick was reduced to
one-thousandth of a dollar. While the change in tick size on Nasdaq is sizeable, the change in tick size on Island
is negligible. We study if the pricing grids on the two markets and their changes had an impact on the strategies
of liquidity suppliers. Did the rather coarse pricing grid prevailing on Nasdaq prior to decimalization constrain
liquidity suppliers on this market? Did Island liquidity suppliers take advantage of the thinner grid prevailing on
this ECN? How did the decimalization affect the competition between the two trading systems?
To conduct our analysis, we combine two sources of data for actively traded Nasdaq stocks. On the one hand
we have downloaded the sequence of trades and order book dynamics from the Island site, on the other hand
we have used the Nastraq dataset from Nasdaq. To study liquidity supply on Island and Nasdaq, we analyze the
distribution of the best quotes on the Island limit order book and on the Nasdaq market (excluding Island quotes)
as well as the placement of limit orders on Island and their profitability.
In the pre–decimalization sample, the Nasdaq spread is equal to one tick more than 80% of the time. Thus the
tick size was binding on Nasdaq and resulted in excessively large spreads. During this sample period, the most
frequent values of the bid–ask spread on Island were one and two Nasdaq ticks. Note, however, that Island traders
were not constrained to place their orders on this relatively coarse grid size. Indeed, we find that the second most
frequent value of the Island spread corresponds to situations where the Nasdaq tick was undercut by just one (very
thin) Island tick. This clustering of Island limit orders is not consistent with the perfect competition hypothesis.
Under the latter, limit order schedules should mirror the marginal cost of liquidity provision (see Glosten, 1994,
and Biais, Martimort and Rochet, 2000), which is unlikely to exhibit clustering.
In the post-decimalization sample, the coarse tick constraint is relaxed on Nasdaq, and accordingly, there is a
marked decrease in the Nasdaq spread. While the change in the Island tick (from 1/256 to 1/1000) was negligible,
we also observe a strong decrease in the Island spread. If Island quotes simply reflected the cost of supplying
liquidity, as requested by competitive behavior, they would not be affected by a change in the tick size prevailing
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on the competing marketplace. Rather, our results suggest that Island limit order traders engaged in competition
for order flow with the Nasdaq market makers more than among themselves. Facing a reduction in the Nasdaq
spread, Island limit order traders had to tighten their quotes. That they were able to do so, and yet had not done it
before, suggests they competed imperfectly and earned rents prior to decimalization.
Under this imperfect competition hypothesis, Island limit orders would be expected to undercut the current
market best quotes more often when these quotes are set by Nasdaq market makers than when they are set by Island
limit orders. To investigate this point we study the frequency of undercutting orders on Island. Undercutting orders
are defined as (non-immediately marketable) limit orders placed within the best quotes (see Biais, Hillion and
Spatt, 1995). We find that, when the best quote is set by an Island order, the probability that the next Island order
will be undercutting is less than 10%. In stark contrast, when the best quote is set by other Nasdaq participants,
the probability that the next Island order be undercutting is greater than 25%. Thus our findings suggest that Island
limit order traders undercut Nasdaq quotes but compete less aggressively against one another to preserve their
rents.
One might wonder how such behaviors could emerge in anonymous markets with potentially many participants.
We learned from discussions with market participants that, while retail day–traders represent a significant fraction
of the number of orders placed in the market, only a limited number of large professional traders monitored Island
and Nasdaq and strategically undercut Nasdaq quotes to earn trading profits. This induces a violation of the second
of the five Stigler–Smith conditions listed above, thus raising the possibility of imperfectly competitive behavior.
To examine these points further, we study whether the gross profits earned by Island limit order traders exceed
the cost they incur to supply liquidity. Using the generalized method of moments, we test restrictions imposed
by theoretical models of competition in limit–order schedules (Glosten (1994) and Biais, Martimort and Rochet
(2000)) and estimate the costs and the rents of liquidity suppliers. The hypothesis that limit orders placed on Island
face no adverse selection cost is rejected. Furthermore, our estimates are consistent with Island limit orders earning
oligopoly rents when the Nasdaq spread was constrained by the coarse pricing grid prevailing on that market. In
contrast, Island quotes observed after the decrease in the Nasdaq tick are consistent with competitive liquidity
supply.
Our analysis sheds light on the way in which the Internet can enhance competition, and correspondingly, in-
crease liquidity. It enables efficient modern market architectures to be established. These compete with the incum-
bent and force them to catch up. But, perfect competition should not be taken for granted, even on an Internet-based
transparent easily accessible limit order book, although Adam Smith’s conditions for perfect competition seem to
hold. Competition between markets is necessary to complement competition among traders.5
5Thus our analysis adds to the debate on centralized vs. fragmented markets (as illustrated by the theoretical studies by Chowdhry and
3
Our emphasis on the competition between markets is in the line of Rust and Hall (2003). They model the
competition between a trading mechanism where quotes are publicly posted by a market maker and another trading
mechanism operated by middlemen. Their theoretical analysis sheds light on the likely effects of the reduction in
search and transactions costs resulting from the information revolution and the advent of the World Wide Web. It
also highlights the risk of undercutting faced by market makers publicly posting bid and ask prices. Our empirical
investigation thus concurs with their theoretical analysis.
Our GMM analysis of limit-order schedules and adverse selection builds on the insightful structural economet-
ric analysis of Sandas (2001), though we take a somewhat different viewpoint. In particular, while Sandas (2001)
assumes competitive liquidity supply, we investigate market power. Our empirical analysis is also related to Has-
brouck and Harris (1996), in particular to their “ex–post performance measure,” which computes the profitability
of different types of orders, e.g., limit orders at the best quotes, when they are executed. Our focus differs from
theirs, however. While they compare the performance of order placement strategies, we focus on the competition to
supply liquidity and document undercutting strategies. Furthermore, our econometric analysis of the profitability
of limit orders relies on a theoretical model, while they take a more descriptive approach. Finally, we take advan-
tage in our identification strategy of the fact that we have two different samples, over which the order–handling
cost is likely to remain constant while other parameters, such as the oligopoly mark–up, are likely to change.
Interesting empirical analyses of ECNs are offered by Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003), Huang (2002),
Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2001). Our focus on the competition for
liquidity supply differs from Huang (2002), who analyzes price discovery, Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick
(2003), who focus upon market quality, and Hasbrouck and Saar (2001), who analyze the relationship between
volatility and the order flow, as well as fleeting orders. Most of these papers rely on Nastraq data, where Island
quotes are rounded to match the Island grid. This precludes observing situations where Island quotes are strictly
better than Nasdaq quotes by less than one Nasdaq tick. In contrast, by using unrounded Island data, we can analyze
the strategies of Island limit order traders undercutting Nasdaq quotes. Thus, we show that the competition between
Nasdaq and Island has been significantly changed by decimalization. Another difference between our paper and
the literature devoted to ECNs is that we develop a new structural econometric approach to analyze quantitatively
the trade–offs between adverse selection costs and oligopoly rents. A by–product of this analysis is to offer a new
method to disentangle components of the spread without relying on parametric assumptions on distributions, while
building directly from a standard microstructure model.
The next section presents the institutional environment. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents our
empirical analysis of orders, quotes and spreads on Island and Nasdaq. Section 5 extends this analysis by offering
Nanda (1991) and Parlour and Seppi (2003)).
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a structural econometric investigation of profits and spreads on Island. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional environment
2.1 ECNs
ECNs use web–based platforms, which collect limit and market orders, and match them or display them on
internet–based order books. In 2002 they have been estimated to capture 39.3% of the dollar volume of trad-
ing in Nasdaq securities (source: Market Data).6 The largest ECN, Instinet, was estimated to represent 12% of the
trading volume on Nasdaq in February 2002, while Island amounted to 9.6%, RediBook to 6.5%, and Archipelago
to 10.5%.7
While ECNs compete with the traditional source of liquidity on Nasdaq (i.e., market makers), they do not take
proprietary positions, but simply handle and display their customer’s orders. They cannot conduct trades away
from the current best market prices and must allocate orders according to price priority. However, time priority is
not enforced between ECNs and Nasdaq market makers.
Interestingly, empirical evidence so far does not suggest that the trading process managed by ECNs is system-
atically free riding on price discovery achieved by the traditional market participants (the Nasdaq dealers). To the
contrary, Huang (2002) shows empirically that ECNs are important contributors to the price discovery process.
2.2 Island
Island is a web–based transparent limit order book.8 Trades and the best 15 quotes on each side of the book can
freely be viewed in real time through the internet. Island subscribers can freely place orders. Trades can take place
from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Immediately executed orders are charged .25 cent per share traded. Non-marketable
limit orders posted in the book receive .1 cent per share when executed, as compensation for supplying liquidity.
When an order is transmitted to Island, if it is not immediately marketable, it is stored and displayed anonymously
in the Island order book. If the order is marketable it is executed at the best market price.
Until April 2001, the Nasdaq tick size was 1/16 and the Island tick size was 1/256. Since April 2001, the Nasdaq
tick size has been reduced to one cent ($0.01), while on Island prices are quoted with a three-digit precision, i.e.,
the tick size is one-thousandth of a dollar. The thinner price grid on Island makes it easier for traders placing orders
on that ECN to undercut Nasdaq market makers’ quotes.
6In March 2000, this proportion was 26.1% and in June 2001 it was 37.1% (McAndrews and Stefanadis, 2000).
7Island captured 6.4% of the trading in Nasdaq securities in March 2000, and 9.5% in June 2001.
8Hasbrouck and Saar (2001) offer a good description of the market structure.
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Until October 2002 the best Island bid and ask quotes were displayed on the Nasdaq screen, along with the best
quotes of ECNs and market makers.9 Note, however, that Island quotes displayed and “advertised” on the Nasdaq
screen were not shown at their actual price (quoted on a thin grid) but at rounded prices (from the Nasdaq grid).
For example, when the Nasdaq tick was one-sixteenth, if the best ask for stock XYZ on Island was one dollar and
1/24, it was displayed on Nasdaq at one dollar and 1/16. Rounding the Island quotes enabled NASDAQ to avoid
price priority constraints, and reduced the ability of the ECN to advertise good quotes and thus attract orders. This
made it very important for Island to use another vehicle besides NASDAQ screens to disseminate information.
This may be one of the reasons for the excellent and easily accessible website Island has developed.
Because of the display of the best Island bid and ask quotes on the Nasdaq screen, if the grid size was the
same in the two market segments, the Nasdaq inside quote would, by construction always be at least as good as the
Island spread. The grid is thinner on Island than on Nasdaq, however. This raises the possibility that Island quotes,
placed on thin ticks inside the relatively coarse grid Nasdaq, could better the Nasdaq quote, at least on one side of
the book.
3 Data
We acquired quotes and trades data from Nasdaq (including the Dealer Quotes (DQ) file, the Inside Quote (IQ)
file, and the Trades (TR) file). We also downloaded a continuous record of the Island book from the Island website
during 5 trading days in March 2000 (from March 8 to March 14) and 5 trading days in June 2001 (from June
18 to June 22). We collected this data for 7 stocks: COMS, Cisco, Dell, Intel, Microsoft, QCom, and Sun. One
advantage of the Island data (downloaded from the Island website) is that it is not rounded to sixteenths (unlike the
ECN quotes reported in the NASDAQ DQ file). Hence we can study the use of fine ticks by Island traders.
We consider data starting at the opening of NASDAQ (at 9:30 or a few minutes before) and ending at the
NASDAQ close: 4:00 p.m. (Because of a data feed problem, for March 10, we have data only between 9:30 and
2:30).
Summary statistics on the Island data and the Nasdaq data are presented in Table 1. The Island data set includes
138432 trades for the March 2000 sample and 139966 trades for the June 2001 sample. The average trade size
on Island in the March 2000 sample is 389 shares, while its counterpart for the June 2001 sample is 450 shares.
The average trade size on Nasdaq is about twice as large (797 shares per trade in 2000 sample and 898 in 2001).
While market activity was comparable in 2000 and 2001, prices fell dramatically; while the average transaction
9In the fall of 2002 Nasdaq introduced its own order book, Super Montage. As briefly discussed in the conclusion below this led to changes
in the interaction between Island and Nasdaq.
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price is 99.14 in the March 2000 sample, it is 31.69 in the June 2001 sample. Volatility tends to be lower in the
2001 sample than in its 2000 counterpart.
4 Orders, quotes and spreads on Island and Nasdaq
4.1 Spreads and quotes
To document the market environment in which Island limit order traders operated, first consider the best quotes
posted on Nasdaq by market makers and other ECNs than Island. In March 2000, the time-weighted average spread
resulting from these quotes was 1.27 sixteenths, i.e., $.079.10 The spread was exactly equal to one tick 81.5% of
the time, while the two other most frequent values of the spread were 2 ticks (13.25% of the time) and 3 ticks
(3.36% of the time). After decimalization, in June 2001, the Nasdaq tick was one cent and the time-weighted
average spread was reduced to $.014. The spread was exactly equal to one tick 78.08% of the time, while the two
other most frequent values of the spread were 2 ticks (12.26% of the time) and 3 ticks (4.23% of the time). Thus,
decimalization led to a dramatic decrease in the average spread on Nasdaq, as well as a reduction in clustering.
This is consistent with the view that the coarse tick size in 2000 constrained liquidity supply and led to artificially
large spreads,11 and that this constraint was relaxed by decimalization.
Now turn to the best quotes placed on Island. In 2000, the time-weighted average spread for our 7 stocks
and our sample period was equal to $ 0.198.12 Thus, the average Island spread was on average larger than the
Nasdaq inside spread resulting from Island’s competitors. Yet, Island limit order traders used the finer pricing grid
prevailing on their market to often undercut the Nasdaq touch. Figure 1, Panel A, depicts the frequency of different
values of the spread for the seven stocks in our sample, on Island and on Nasdaq in March 2000.13 As illustrated in
the figure there is marked clustering in the data. Clustering on one Nasdaq tick is less frequent for the Island spread
than for the Nasdaq inside spread. Interestingly, the spread on Island was quite often just one Island tick below
these levels, e.g., 15/256, 31/256, etc. This is likely to reflect undercutting, by a fine increment, of the Nasdaq
spread by Island liquidity providers. By following this strategy, they acquire price priority relatively cheaply.14
10Average spreads for each of the 7 stocks in our sample are presented in Table 1. Across all stocks, the mode and the median spreads were
equal to exactly one-sixteenth ($.0625).
11As illustrated in other contexts by Harris (1991, 1994).
12The mode and the median were 32/256, i.e., $.125. Average spreads on Island for the 7 stocks in our sample are presented in Table 1. In
the appendix we present additional evidence on the comparison between the Nasdaq and Island spreads.
13Our graphical representation of the empirical frequency of different values of the spread is similar to Figure 2 in Barclay et al, 1999. In the
appendix, we provide additional information on the comparison between the Island and Nasdaq spreads, and on the instances where the Island
quotes bettered their Nasdaq counterpart.
14Note however that, since Island prices were rounded before being represented on the Nasdaq system, the Island liquidity suppliers benefitted
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In June 2001, the average spread on Island for our 7 stocks was $ 0.0648. This is definitely below the corre-
sponding figures for March 2000. Figure 1, Panel B, presents the histogram of spread sizes on Island and Nasdaq
for our June 2001 sample. As in the March 2000 case, there is a lot of clustering on the Nasdaq price grid. The
Island spread and that of its competitors are most frequently equal to .01, .02 and .03, .04 or .05. There also is
clustering for the Island spread just one tick below these values, reflecting undercutting of the Nasdaq quotes.
Comparing the distribution of Island spreads in June 2001 to its March 2000 counterpart points to the stark re-
duction in spreads contemporaneous to the reduction in the Nasdaq tick from 1/16 to 1/100 and the practically
negligible reduction in the Island tick during that period from 1/256 to 1/1000.
These preliminary results cast doubts on the hypothesis that Island limit order traders were perfectly compet-
itive. Under perfect competition, Island best quotes would simply reflect the cost of supplying liquidity. In this
case, they would not cluster at, or just one small Island tick within, the Nasdaq touch. Rather, they would be spread
more diffusely on the very thin Island price grid. Furthermore, it’s not clear why the change in tick size on the
Nasdaq market would imply a decrease in the cost of supplying liquidity on the Island limit order book. Note that
in that market the size was already extremely small in 2000 (as it equalled $ 1/256). Hence, the reduction to $
1/1000, which took place in 2001, was not likely to have any direct effect on the best quotes on Island. Thus, it’s
difficult to reconcile the strong decrease in spreads on Island, between 2000 and 2001, with the perfect competition
hypothesis. Rather, our results suggest that Island limit order traders engaged in competition for order flow with
the Nasdaq market makers more than among themselves.
4.2 Order placement
The above discussion raised the possibility that Island limit order traders were imperfectly competitive. The goal
of the present subsection is to shed more light on this point, using order flow data. Under the hypothesis that,
while Island limit order traders compete market share away from Nasdaq, competition within Island is less strong,
undercutting of the best quotes by Island limit orders should be more prevalent when the best quotes are set by
Nasdaq than when they are set by the Island book.
To test this conjecture, we analyzed the Island order flow in more detail. In line with Biais, Hillion and Spatt
(1995) we differentiated 12 categories of events:
• trades resulting from the placement of market orders to buy or sell;
• new buy or sell limit orders not immediately executed, placed within the best quotes, at the best quotes, or
away from the best quotes;
from this priority advantage only with respect to the Island order flow.
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• cancellations of orders, at or away from the best quotes, on the bid or the ask side;
Table 2 reports the frequency of each of these 12 events in ten different situations for the 2000 sample. Panel A
reports the frequencies of events occurring on the ask side of the book (market or limit orders to sell), while Panel
B reports the frequencies of events occurring on the bid side (market or limit orders to buy). In each panel, the
first column reports the unconditional frequencies, while the 9 other columns, report the frequencies conditional
on which market sets the best price, on the bid side and the ask side. For example, the second column corresponds
to the instances where the best bid and the best ask quote were both quoted by Island, while the third column
corresponds to the case where the best bid was quoted by Island and the best ask by Nasdaq market makers or
other ECNs than Island. To conduct this conditional analysis we merged the Island data file and the Nasdaq IQ
data file.15 Inspecting the two panels of Table 2, we note that cancellations and order placement away from the
best quotes are quite frequent. For example, their frequency is much higher than in the Paris Bourse (see Biais,
Hillion and Spatt, 1995).
Undercutting corresponds to the placement of limit sell orders within the quotes. The frequencies reported
in Table 2, Panel A, show that undercutting of the best market ask by Island limit orders is more frequent when
Nasdaq sets the best ask than when Island sets the best ask. When the best bid is set by Island, the frequency of
undercutting by Island orders is 4.54% when the best ask is set by Island, and 26.55% when the best ask is set
by Nasdaq. When the best bid is set by Nasdaq, the frequency of undercutting by Island orders is 7.99% when
the best ask is set by Island, and 37.48% when the best ask is set by Nasdaq. When the best bid is the same on
Island and Nasdaq, the frequency of undercutting by Island orders is 4.39% when the best ask is set by Island,
and 29.58% when the best ask is set by Nasdaq. To put these numbers in perspective, we can compare them to
their counterparts in Panel B, which report the frequency of improvements of the best bid by Island limit orders.
Whether Island or Nasdaq sets the best ask quote has less impact on the relative magnitude of these frequencies.16
15This was made difficult by synchronicity problems. The consequences of these non–synchronicity problems and the way we dealt with
them are discussed in the appendix.
16For example, when the best bid is set by Island, the frequency of bid improvements by Island orders is 4.78% when the best ask is set
by Island, and 9.40% when the best ask is set by Nasdaq. When the best bid is set by Nasdaq, the frequency of bid improvements by Island
orders is 25.17% when the best ask is set by Island, and 40.85% when the best ask is set by Nasdaq. When the best bid is the same on Island
and Nasdaq, the frequency of bid improvements by Island orders is 11.96% when the best ask is set by Island, and 23.35% when the best ask
is set by Nasdaq. These pairs of frequencies are ordered in the same way as their counterpart for undercutting on the ask side, but the effect
is less strong. This similarity might reflect the alternance of phases of activity and inactivity on Island. During the former, undercutting and
improvements are frequent, and Island often establishes the best quotes, though not during the latter. That the identity of the market setting the
best ask quote has much less impact on the frequency of bid improvements than on that of undercutting on the ask side is consistent with our
imperfect competition hypothesis,
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A similar result holds on the bid side. Improvements of the best bid correspond to the placement of limit buy
orders within the quotes. The frequencies reported in Table 2, Panel B, show that improvements of the best bid
by Island limit orders are more frequent when Nasdaq sets the best bid than when Island sets the best bid. When
the best ask is set by Island, the frequency of undercutting by Island orders is 4.78% when the best bid is set by
Island, and 25.17% when the best bid is set by Nasdaq. When the best ask is set by Nasdaq, the frequency of bid
improvements by Island orders is 9.40% when the best bid is set by Island, and 40.85% when the best bid is set
by Nasdaq. When the best ask is the same on Island and Nasdaq, the frequency of improvements by Island orders
is 5.15% when the best bid is set by Island, and 30.79% when the best bid is set by Nasdaq. Whether Island or
Nasdaq sets the best bid quote has less impact on the relative magnitude of undercutting on the ask side.
Table 3 reports similar frequencies for the 2001 sample. Panel A focuses on the ask side of the book. Compare
the frequencies of undercutting when Island sets the best ask and when Nasdaq sets the best ask: They are 5.25%
and 14.10%, respectively, when Island sets the best bid; 8.89% and 29.97%, respectively, when Nasdaq sets the
best bid; 4.55% and 21.64%, respectively, when the best bids are the same on Island and Nasdaq. Comparing these
figures to their counterparts in Panel B, one observes that whether Island or Nasdaq sets the best ask quote has
less impact on the relative magnitude of these frequencies. Inspecting Panel B, one can observe that similar results
obtain for the bid side of the book.
These results are in line with the hypothesis that Island limit order traders compete more aggressively with
Nasdaq than with one another, as the frequency of undercutting on the ask side is greater when the best ask is
quoted by Nasdaq, while the frequency of improvements on the bid side is greater when the best bid is quoted by
Nasdaq. The magnitude of this effect is more pronounced in 2000 than in 2001, suggesting that deviations from
perfect competition were stronger in the former year than in the latter.
4.3 Conclusion
Putting together the above results, the following picture of the competition between Nasdaq and Island emerges:
Before decimalization, liquidity supply on Nasdaq was constrained by the coarse tick size, resulting in large
spreads. Island limit order traders took advantage of that situation by frequently undercutting the Nasdaq quote
by just one thin Island tick. While they competed market share away from Nasdaq, they competed much less
aggressively among themselves on Island.
The decrease in the Nasdaq tick brought about by decimalization led to a stark decrease in the Nasdaq spread.
There was no significant contemporaneous change in the Island tick, which was already very thin before 2001, and
unlikely to constrain order placement. Yet, the Island spread was strongly reduced by decimalization on Nasdaq.
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This reduction took place because the Island limit order traders had to react to the decrease of the spread of their
Nasdaq competitors. That they were able to engage in this reduction, and yet had not done it before, is suggestive
of imperfect competition among Island liquidity suppliers. The next section studies this point further.
5 An econometric analysis of the costs and profits of Island limit order
traders
5.1 Theoretical framework
In this section we examine econometrically the costs incurred by Island limit order traders and the profits they
earn. Consider a limit order to sell, at timet, at the best quote in the Island limit order book:At. If this order is
filled its profit is:
At − v − (c− f),
wherev is the fundamental value of the asset,c is the order–handling cost incurred by the limit order trader, andf
is the compensation offered by Island to executed limit orders. Note thatf is not a parameter to be estimated, but
an observable pricing rule set by Island.
Now consider a standard market microstructure model (as in Glosten, 1994): competitive risk neutral limit
order traders face risk–averse investors privately informed about the underlying value of the stock and their own
risk–sharing needs. In this case, the marginal limit order just breaks even on average. Denoting the expected profit
π, this break-even condition can be written as:
π = E(At − v − (c− f)|Ht, Qt ≥ QAt) = 0,
whereHt is the information set of the liquidity suppliers just before receiving the order,Qt is the size of the
market buy order hittingAt, andQAt is the depth of the order book at the best quote.
17 As first emphasized by
Rock (1990) and Glosten (1994), the conditioning set in this upper tail expectation reflects the workings of the
limit order book: the marginal limit order at the best ask in the book is executed if and only if the total size of the
market buy order is greater than or equal to the depth at the best ask price in the book.18 The limit order reflects
17Traders also can place hidden orders, but these have no time priority over the visible orders. Hence, hidden orders do not affect the
conditioning set for the conditional expectation of the value of the security relevant for the marginal visible order at the first level in the book.
18This differs from the information structure arising in the signaling trading game analyzed in Kyle (1985). In the latter, the transaction price
is equal to the expectation of the value of the asset conditional on the exact size of the trade.
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this informational content of trades. A symmetric equality holds on the bid side of the book.
On the other hand, if the limit order traders are strategic, as in Bernhardt and Hughson (1997), and Biais,
Martimort and Rochet (2000), their expected profits are not equal to zero. In that case, the relevant condition is:
E(At − v − (c + π − f)|Qt ≥ QAt) = 0,
where the expected profit (π) is not in general equal to 0, as long as the number of liquidity suppliers,N , is finite.
As shown in Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000), whenN goes to infinity, the oligopolistic mark–upπ goes to 0,
and quotes go to their competitive level.
5.2 Econometric approach
In this subsection we show how the bid and ask equations above yield empirical restrictions which can be used to
test the model and estimate its parameters. Subtracting the bid from the ask, the spread is:
At −Bt = α + 2(c− f + π),
where:
α = [E(v|Qt ≥ QAt ,Ht)− E(v|Qt ≤ −|QBt |,Ht)]
denotes the informational component of the spread.
Some time after (say at timet + ∆t), the liquidity suppliers have updated their expectation of the fundamental
value of the asset to form:
E(v|Ht+∆t).
This can be proxied, for example, by the mid–quote say half an hour or an hour after the trade:
mt+∆t = E(v|Ht+∆t) + εt+∆t.
For simplicity, we assume thatεt+∆t is white noise. In this context, we obtain that:
mt+∆t −At = [E(v|Ht+∆t) + εt+∆t]− [E(v|Qt ≥ QAt ,Ht) + c− f + π].
Taking expectations conditional on the occurrence of the purchase at timet:
E(mt+∆t −At|Qt ≥ QAt ,Ht) =
E([E(v|Ht+∆t) + εt+∆t]− [E(v|Qt ≥ QAt ,Ht) + c− f + πi]|Qt ≥ QAt ,Ht).
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Applying the law of iterated expectations:
E([E(v|Ht+∆t) + εt+∆t]|Qt ≥ QAt ,Ht) = E(v|Qt ≥ QAt ,Ht).
Hence, the expected difference between the ask price and the subsequent mid–quote simplifies to:
E(At −mt+∆t|Qt ≥ QAt , Ht) = c− f + π.
A similar equality holds for the bid side:
E(mt+∆t −Bt|Qt ≤ −|QBt |,Ht) = c− f + π.
The intuition is that, on average, the informational component of the spread differences out, so that the dif-
ference between the transaction price and the subsequent midquote, i.e., the gross trading profit of the liquidity
supplier, is equal to his non–informational cost (c net of the compensation offered by Island to liquidity supply,f )
plus the oligopoly rent (π).
The above analysis yields two moment conditions, which can be used to estimate the parameters and test the
model:
E(At −Bt − [α + 2(c− f + π)]|Ht) = 0, (1)
and:
E([Bt − (mt+∆t − (c− f + π))]I(Qt ≤ −|QBt |)
+[At − (mt+∆t + (c− f + π))]I(Qt ≥ QAt)|Ht) = 0. (2)
whereI(.)is the indicator function equal to 1 when the condition in the argument holds and 0 otherwise.
The second moment condition enables one to identifyc + π. Denoteθ the sum of these two parameters.
Given the estimate ofθ (obtained from the second moment condition),α can be estimated, using the first moment
condition. While in practice we estimateθ andα jointly, and thus do not follow this two-step procedure, this
discussion indicates thatα is identifiable. Unfortunately, we cannot identify separately the two components ofθ.
Yet, we can rely on two approaches to obtain additional information about these components.
1. The descriptive statistics reported in the previous section suggest that Island liquidity suppliers exert strategic
behavior by undercutting the Nasdaq touch by just one tick. Thus, we posit that such undercutting reflects
13
strategic behavior. Under perfect competition,π would be equal to 0, and the fact that Island traders just
undercut the Nasdaq grid would be irrelevant for their profits. Under the alternative hypothesis that Island
traders are strategic, this undercutting behavior should affect profits. To test the null hypothesis of perfect
competition in our GMM framework, we will include in the instruments an indicator variable equal to one
when the best quote is set by an undercutting order. Under the null hypothesis, this instrument should be
irrelevant. Under the alternative hypothesis of strategic behavior including this instrument should lead to
rejecting the model.
2. We observe data from two subperiods: period 1 before decimalization, and period 2 after. A priori there is no
reason to expectα or π to be constant across the two periods. Indeed, a change in the oligopoly mark–upπ
is to be expected, since the market environments are different in the two samples, reflecting the change in the
tick size on Nasdaq. The information content of tradesα also might well have changed. Correspondingly,
we carry the estimation separately over the two periods, which yields two sets of parameter estimates:{α1,
θ1} and{α2, θ2}. On the other hand, it is plausible that the order-handling costc is constant across our two
subsamples. Under this assumption, we disentangleπ from c by comparing the results obtained for the two
periods. Sinceθ1 = c + π1 andθ2 = c + π2 we have that:θ1 − θ2 = π1 − π2. Thus, if we find that
θ1 − θ2 > 0 and sinceπ2 must be non–negative, we know thatπ1 > 0.
Finally note that our approach to decomposing the spread is robust and avoids relying upon auxiliary parametric
assumptions, instead building directly upon a fundamental microstructure model.
5.3 Empirical results
5.3.1 Observations and instruments
As discussed above, if limit order traders are competitive and risk neutral, the marginal limit orders break even on
average (in line with Glosten, 1994, and Sandas, 2001). In contrast, with a discrete pricing grid, infra-marginal
orders can earn profits, even in the competitive case. Hence, to test the hypothesis that liquidity supply is compet-
itive, we impose the moment conditions only on trades involving marginal limit orders in the book. For example,
suppose that, at the best ask quote in the book, 500 shares are offered. A market buy order for 250 shares would
not hit the marginal limit order. Hence it would not be included in the data we use to estimate the model and test
the competitive hypothesis. In contrast, a market buy order for 500 shares or more would be included.
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5.3.2 A first, simple, specification
First we estimate a simple specification, where it is assumed that the parameters are constant across market con-
ditions. The instruments are the square of the change in the stock price during the last half–hour, to proxy for the
volatility, and the sign of the last trade. The parameter estimates are presented in Table 4:
• As can be seen in the table, the estimates ofα are significantly positive in both subperiods. Negative es-
timates ofα would have contradicted the model. Significantly positive estimates lead to rejection of the
hypothesis that there is no adverse selection.
• The estimate ofc + π is positive in 2000 for 6 stocks out of 7, and significantly so for 3 stocks. It is also
significantly positive for the pooled data. Hence, we reject the hypothesis that there is no order–handling cost
or market power in that period. In contrast, the estimate ofc + π is significantly positive only for one stock
out of seven after decimalization. For this period, it is not significantly different from 0 for the pooled data.
Thus, overall, the result is thatc + π was positive before decimalization, but not after. Under the plausible
assumption thatc did not vary between the two periods, this suggests that liquidity supply on Island was
imperfectly competitive before decimalization and competitive afterwards, i.e.,π was significantly positive
during the first period and not significantly different from zero in the second period.
5.3.3 A more flexible specification
While the assumption thatc is constant through time and market conditions is reasonable, adverse selection and
rent-earning opportunities are likely to vary. Consequently, we estimate a more flexible specification allowing the
parameters to vary with market conditions. In this specification the adverse selection cost parameter for stockk at





is a vector of parameters andXkt is a vector of variables including:
• the constant,
• the depth at the best ask quote for observations corresponding to purchases, and depth at the best bid for
observations corresponding to sales,
• the square of the change in the stock price during the last half–hour, to proxy for the volatility.
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Similarly, θkt = βθ
k
Xkt . The instruments used to carry out the estimation are the variables inX
k
t , to which we
add the sign of the last trade.
The parameter estimates and the p–values for this more flexible specification are presented in Table 5. Both in
2000 and in 2001 the null hypothesis that the model is correct is not rejected at the 5% level for 4 stocks out of
7. This suggests reasonable adequacy of the model to the data.19 The p–level is much smaller when the model is
estimated with the pooled data suggesting that parameters do differ across stocks.
For the adverse selection component of the spread, the constant (i.e., the first element ofβα) is significantly
positive for 5 stocks out of seven and for the pooled data, both in 2000 and in 2001. This reinforces our previous
finding that Island liquidity suppliers face significant adverse selection costs. Regarding depth and volatility there
is no clear pattern in the parameter estimates. Neither is there any clear pattern either in the parameter estimates
relative toθ, except that in 2000 the order-handling cost/market power parameter is increasing in volatility.
5.3.4 The role of undercutting
Under perfect competition, Island limit orders’ expected profits should be zero, irrespective of whether they un-
dercut Nasdaq or not. Thus, the indicator variable equal to one when the Nasdaq grid is undercut by just one tick
should be unrelated to the profit of Island orders. Hence, to test the null hypothesis of perfect competition, we
include this indicator variable in the instruments.
The p–level and parameter estimates obtained when undercutting is included in the set of instruments are
presented in Table 6. The model is now rejected at the 5% level in 5 cases out of 7 in 2000 and 6 cases out of 7
in 2001. This contrasts with the results obtained when undercutting was not included in the instruments (in that
case the model was rejected in for 3 stocks only in 2000 and in 2001). These results point to the relevance of
undercutting for the profits of Island limit order traders. While this would be expected to arise with strategic limit
order placement, this contradicts the perfect competition hypothesis.
This suggests to explore further the determinants of liquidity suppliers’ rents by including the indicator of
undercutting in the variables in the flexible model. Table 7 presents the parameter estimates and p–values obtained
in this specification. As in Table 5, the null hypothesis that the model is correct is not rejected at the 5% level for
4 stocks out of 7. Parameter estimates for the constant, volatility and depth are similar to those reported in the
previous table, which speaks in favor of the robustness of the model. For the market power/order-handling costs
parameter, the estimate corresponding to the undercutting variable is positive for 5 stocks out of 7. While this
is significant for only 2 stocks in 2000 and one stock in 2001, this is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that
19This reasonable fit of our structural model with a flexible specification is not unlike that obtained in Sandas (2001).
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Island limit order traders earn rents by undercutting the Nasdaq grid.
6 Conclusion
This paper is a study in the industrial organization of financial markets. We examine the competition between limit
order traders as well as the competition between markets. We find that, before decimalization, Nasdaq spreads
were constrained by the tick size, and were correspondingly excessively wide. Reacting to this situation, limit
order traders used Island as a platform to compete for the supply of liquidity. To do so they often undercut the
Nasdaq inside quotes, by using the finer Island grid. Undercutting on Island did not lead to competitive liquidity
supply, however. In contrast with zero–profit free–entry equilibrium, limit orders placed on Island, before the
Nasdaq decimalization, earned positive profits (net of transactions costs). After the Nasdaq decimalization, the
Island spread became much tighter. In this context, the rents earned by Island limit orders virtually disappeared.
Our results suggest that the wide dissemination of information and the reduction in the costs of accessing
markets brought about by the internet technology are important but not sufficient to eliminate market power in
financial markets, in particular in the supply of liquidity. In addition to the competition between liquidity suppliers
within a marketplace, competition between trading mechanisms plays an important role.
In the fall of 2002, Nasdaq introduced a new trading mechanism, Super Montage, enabling the display of orders
in an electronic book. While this made Nasdaq more similar to Island, it did not reduce the competition between
the two markets. Island does not participate in Super Montage. While it continues to run its electronic limit order
book, its orders are represented on the Cincinnati Stock Exchange and appear on the Nasdaq level 1 and 2 screens
under the heading “Cinn”. Analyzing the evolution of the competition between the electronic limit order books of
the incumbent (Nasdaq) and the new entrants (the ECNs) is an interesting avenue of further research.
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Table 1: Summary statistics on daily activity
The table reports the average daily number of trades, the average trade size (in terms of number of
shares per trade), the average $ spread, the average difference between the highest and the lowest
transaction price of the day, the average transaction price, and the average daily return. The statistics
are given for each stock in the sample and also when pooling all stocks.
Panel A: 2000 Sample
# trades Trade size Spread (in $) Hi-Low Price Return
Stock Nasdaq Island Nasdaq Island Nasdaq Island (in $)
COMS 20,585 2,829 659 393 .080 .218 5.85 64.6 -.045
CSCO 39,831 5,141 655 338 .076 .178 6.15 136.1 -.003
DELL 52,255 5,879 1,185 478 .064 .092 3.33 52.8 .029
INTC 31,521 3,929 779 392 .075 .211 5.69 119.5 .006
MSFT 41,279 5,157 942 416 .071 .147 3.99 97.6 .010
QCOM 37,713 4,834 463 331 .106 .282 10.50 131.0 .007
SUNW 21,897 2,611 583 331 .083 .256 5.18 94.0 -.010
All 35,012 4,340 797 389 .079 .198 5.81 99.1 -.001
20
Panel B: 2001 Sample
# trades Trade size Spread (in $) Hi-Low Price Return
Stock Nasdaq Island Nasdaq Island Nasdaq Island (in $)
COMS 2,596 278 1,271 326 .015 .072 0.27 4.62 -.0008
CSCO 53,569 6,599 1,121 603 .011 .030 1.16 17.16 -.0072
DELL 26,655 3,174 869 447 .012 .060 1.22 23.73 -.0100
INTC 45,518 5,922 848 482 .011 .046 1.46 27.48 -.007
MSFT 39,750 5,472 713 372 .013 .086 2.02 68.55 -.0001
QCOM 25,312 4,157 481 258 .028 .126 3.17 51.06 .0055
SUNW 40,694 5,420 1,092 464 .011 .034 1.05 14.61 -.022
All 33,442 4,432 898 450 .014 .065 1.48 31.69 -.0059
21
Table 2: Frequency of different types of orders on Island in 2000
We identify 6 categories of orders on each side of the book (buy and sell), differentiating them by execution
status (immediate in the case of market orders, delayed for new quotes placed in the book, prevented in the case of
cancellations) and location in the book (at, within or away from the best quotes). Pooling all stocks, we compute
the relative frequency of each of these events on each side of the book. The first column reports unconditional
frequencies, while the 9 remaining columns report frequencies conditional on 9 different situations: 1) when the
best bid and ask quotes are set by Island, 2) when the best bid is set by Island but the best ask is set by Nasdaq,
3) when the best bid is set by Island and the ask is the same on Island and Nasdaq, 4) when the best bid is set by
Nasdaq while the best ask is set by Island, 5) when the best bid and ask are set by Nasdaq, 6) when the best bid is
set by Nasdaq and the ask is the same on Island and Nasdaq, 7) when the bid is the same on Nasdaq and Island and
the best ask is set by Island, 8) when the bid is the same on Nasdaq and Island and the best ask is set by Nasdaq,
and 9) when the bid and the ask are the same on Island and Nasdaq. Panel A focuses on the ask side of the book
(orders to sell), while Panel B focuses on the bid side (orders to buy). Each column within each panel is a vector
of relative frequencies adding up to 100%.
Panel A: Ask side
Best Bid set by: All Isld Isld Isld Nasdaq Nasdaq Nasdaq Same Same Same
Best Ask set by: All Isld Nasdaq Same Isld Nasdaq Same Isld Nasdaq Same
Cancel ask at 13.66 14.71 12.25 18.16 9.84 12.91 16.55 12.25 13.58 17.09
best quotes
Cancel ask away 24.44 27.36 12.74 17.71 35.74 21.69 25.89 30.51 18.17 21.45
from best quotes
New ask at 12.96 5.76 9.92 22.27 6.43 9.02 26.08 5.44 8.32 20.76
best quotes
New ask away 22.34 32.06 16.45 17.41 36.82 15.80 15.81 31.79 14.62 14.79
from best quotes
New ask within 15.82 4.54 26.55 7.80 7.99 37.48 12.53 4.39 29.58 8.27
best quotes
Sale 10.78 15.58 22.09 16.65 3.18 3.11 3.14 15.61 15.73 17.66
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Panel B: Bid Side
Best Bid set by: All Isld Isld Isld Nasdaq Nasdaq Nasdaq Same Same Same
Best Ask set by: All Isld Nasdaq Same Isld Nasdaq Same Isld Nasdaq Same
Cancel bid at 13.90 17.00 13.12 17.69 12.44 12.61 13.96 14.60 12.74 13.59
best quotes
Cancel bid away 23.78 26.10 34.46 27.79 12.39 19.43 15.36 18.45 23.62 18.86
from best quotes
New bid at 8.96 5.88 7.33 5.74 7.47 7.20 7.40 16.50 16.99 15.16
best quotes
New bid away 21.82 25.28 31.95 25.19 13.44 16.17 14.16 17.21 19.14 17.69
from best quotes
New bid within 18.41 4.78 9.40 5.15 25.17 40.85 30.79 11.96 23.35 14.71
best quotes
Purchase 13.13 20.96 3.74 18.43 29.09 3.75 18.33 21.28 4.15 20.00
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Table 3: Frequency of different types of orders on Island in 2001
We identify 6 categories of orders on each side of the book (buy and sell), differentiating them by execution
status (immediate in the case of market orders, delayed for new quotes placed in the book, prevented in the case of
cancellations) and location in the book (at, within or away from the best quotes). Pooling all stocks, we compute
the relative frequency of each of these events on each side of the book. The first column reports unconditional
frequencies, while the 9 remaining columns report frequencies conditional on 9 different situations: 1) when the
best bid and ask quotes are set by Island, 2) when the best bid is set by Island but the best ask is set by Nasdaq,
3) when the best bid is set by Island and the ask is the same on Island and Nasdaq, 4) when the best bid is set by
Nasdaq while the best ask is set by Island, 5) when the best bid and ask are set by Nasdaq, 6) when the best bid is
set by Nasdaq and the ask is the same on Island and Nasdaq, 7) when the bid is the same on Nasdaq and Island and
the best ask is set by Island, 8) when the bid is the same on Nasdaq and Island and the best ask is set by Nasdaq,
and 9) when the bid and the ask are the same on Island and Nasdaq. Panel A focuses on the ask side of the book
(orders to sell), while Panel B focuses on the bid side (orders to buy). Each column within each panel is a vector
of relative frequencies adding up to 100%.
Panel A: Ask side
Best Bid set by: All Isld Isld Isld Nasdaq Nasdaq Nasdaq Same Same Same
Best Ask set by: All Isld Nasdaq Same Isld Nasdaq Same Isld Nasdaq Same
Cancel ask at 10.09 13.42 8.28 12.04 10.26 9.69 10.82 13.11 9.70 12.35
best quotes
Cancel ask away 29.56 29.07 24.19 25.54 34.53 29.95 30.16 29.74 26.82 25.77
from best quotes
New ask at 7.63 6.21 3.87 9.81 8.94 3.65 14.65 7.63 3.76 13.66
best quotes
New ask away 26.73 28.67 24.77 25.61 33.33 23.50 23.76 27.53 24.55 22.91
from best quotes
New ask within 15.83 5.25 14.10 5.75 8.89 29.97 16.55 4.55 21.64 6.90
best quotes
Sale 10.16 17.37 24.79 21.25 4.05 3.25 4.06 17.43 13.53 18.40
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Panel B: Bid Side
Best Bid set by: All Isld Isld Isld Nasdaq Nasdaq Nasdaq Same Same Same
Best Ask set by: All Isld Nasdaq Same Isld Nasdaq Same Isld Nasdaq Same
Cancel bid at 9.79 14.22 10.14 13.23 8.20 8.81 9.57 10.07 10.62 11.87
best quotes
Cancel bid away 29.52 27.21 33.83 27.83 22.81 30.68 27.12 25.00 30.43 24.69
from best quotes
New bid at 6.68 5.75 9.05 7.27 3.55 3.31 4.00 8.48 10.73 10.00
best quotes
New bid away 28.15 28.16 33.12 28.11 25.32 25.77 26.43 26.36 26.17 25.07
from best quotes
New bid within 15.73 5.28 9.60 4.82 12.96 28.45 19.83 6.08 18.21 7.15
best quotes
Purchase 10.14 19.38 4.25 18.74 27.16 2.98 13.05 24.01 3.83 21.22
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Table 4: GMM estimates when the parameters are assumed to be constant across market conditions
The adverse selection cost parameter for stockk: αk, and the order-handling cost/market power pa-
rameter: θk, are estimated from the 2 moment conditions given in equations (1) and (2). The in-
struments are the square of the change in the stock price during the last half–hour, to proxy for the
volatility, as well as the sign of last trade. t-statistics are given in italics below the corresponding
parameter values.
Panel A: 2000 Sample


















Panel B: 2001 Sample


















Table 5: GMM estimates of the flexible model






is a vector of parameters andXkt is a vector of variables equal to: the constant, the depth at the best
ask quote for observations corresponding to purchases, and the depth at the best bid for observations
corresponding to sales, as well as the square of the change in the stock price during the last half–hour,
to proxy for the volatility. Similarly, the order–handling–cost/market power parameter is specified as:
θk1,t = β
θkXkt . The set of instruments includes the variables as well as the sign of last trade. t-statistics
are given in italics below the corresponding parameter values.
Panel A: 2000 Sample
COMS CSCO DELL INTC MSFT QCOM SUNW All
Obs 3709 7293 5557 5634 6971 5343 3847 38354
alpha
constant 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.12
2.91 2.23 3.15 1.87 2.19 0.53 2.46 5.65
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.37 0.38 1.15 -1.56 0.23 -3.31 -1.01 -1.24
volat -0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.09 -0.01
-2.17 1.29 -1.81 -1.20 -1.51 1.88 -1.40 -1.87
theta
constant -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.00
-0.92 -0.42 -0.85 0.50 -0.10 1.58 -0.42 0.27
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.39 -0.11 -0.99 1.82 0.08 3.53 1.50 1.46
volat 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.01
2.31 -0.61 1.94 1.57 1.96 -1.69 1.41 3.02
p-value 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.05 0.56 0.00
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Panel B: 2001 Sample
COMS CSCO DELL INTC MSFT QCOM SUNW All
Obs 221 8178 4819 8775 8750 7547 8219 46509
alpha
constant 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04
4.03 1.18 4.16 2.52 3.81 2.33 5.79 6.95
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.79 0.86 -1.26 1.05 -2.41 1.45 -2.01 -1.32
volat -0.91 0.34 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01
-0.80 2.43 -0.30 -0.67 -1.01 -1.29 -1.07 -0.76
theta
constant 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.20 1.50 -0.81 0.26 0.56 1.10 -1.26 1.01
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.09 -0.77 1.27 -1.07 2.24 -1.56 2.03 -0.17
volat 0.50 -0.17 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
0.84 -2.46 0.30 0.90 0.63 1.13 1.15 1.36
p-value 0.12 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.04
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Table 6: Flexible model when undercutting is included in the instruments but not in the variables
The adverse selection cost parameter at timet (α1,t) is specified as:α1,t = βαXt, whereβα is a
vector of parameters andXt is a vector of variables equal to: the constant, the depth at the best ask
quote for purchases and at the best bid for sales, as well as the square of the change in the stock price
during the last half–hour to proxy for volatility. The order–handling–cost/market power parameter is
specified as:θ1,t = βθXt. Instruments include the variables, the sign of last trade, and the indicator
variable equal to one if the Island limit order which has been hit bettered the Nasdaq grid by just one
Island tick. t-statistics are given in italics below the corresponding parameter values.
Panel A: 2000 Sample
COMS CSCO DELL INTC MSFT QCOM SUNW All
Obs 3709 7293 5557 5634 6971 5343 3847 38354
alpha
constant 0.22 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.19 0.11
2.96 2.03 3.26 1.98 2.17 0.46 2.49 5.44
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.39 0.39 1.13 -1.69 0.23 -3.31 -1.11 -1.09
volat -0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.09 -0.01
-2.16 1.33 -1.74 -1.20 -1.53 2.06 -1.47 -1.87
theta
constant -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.01
-0.97 -0.22 -0.97 0.44 -0.06 1.63 -0.51 0.48
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.40 -0.12 -0.97 1.93 0.08 3.50 1.67 1.50
volat 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.01
2.32 -0.66 1.86 1.57 1.98 -1.76 1.47 3.02
p-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.09 0.00
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Panel B: 2001 Sample
COMS CSCO DELL INTC MSFT QCOM SUNW All
Obs 221.00 8178.00 4819.00 8775.00 8750.00 7547.00 8219.00 46509.00
alpha
constant 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04
3.71 1.13 4.11 2.61 3.80 2.30 5.72 6.83
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.77 0.62 -1.31 1.06 -2.44 1.41 -2.03 -1.26
volat -1.01 0.36 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01
-0.89 2.55 -0.42 -0.80 -0.92 -1.24 -1.14 -0.69
theta
constant 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.69 1.55 -0.79 0.16 0.41 1.09 -1.20 1.14
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.03 -0.57 1.32 -1.11 2.34 -1.50 2.03 -0.23
volat 0.58 -0.18 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
0.98 -2.61 0.45 1.00 0.53 1.08 1.23 1.28
p-value 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 7: Flexible model when undercutting is included in the instruments and the variables
Adverse selection at timet is α1,t = βαXt, whereXt is a vector of variables: the constant, the depth
at the best ask for purchases and at the best bid for sales, the square of the change in the stock price
during the last half–hour to proxy for volatility, and the indicator variable equal to one if the Island
limit order which has been hit bettered the Nasdaq grid by just one Island tick. The order–handling–
cost/market power parameter is:θk1,t = β
θkXkt . Instruments include the variables and the sign of last
trade. t-statistics are given in italics below the corresponding parameter values.
Panel A: 2000 Sample
COMS CSCO DELL INTC MSFT QCOM SUNW All
Obs 3709 7293 5557 5634 6971 5343 3847 38354
alpha
constant 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.13
2.56 2.62 3.56 1.65 2.17 0.60 2.43 5.63
undercut 0.14 -0.24 -0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.15 0.01 -0.05
1.21 -2.66 -1.93 0.55 -0.36 -0.62 0.05 -1.28
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.43 0.61 1.02 -1.59 0.25 -3.31 -1.00 -1.19
volat -0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.09 -0.01
-2.15 1.28 -1.81 -1.16 -1.53 1.88 -1.40 -1.91
theta
constant -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.00
-0.67 -0.86 -1.41 0.56 -0.18 1.47 -0.45 -0.01
undercut -0.06 0.12 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.02
-1.04 2.62 2.07 -0.36 0.36 0.81 0.25 1.37
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.44 -0.34 -0.85 1.84 0.06 3.52 1.45 1.41
volat 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.01
2.30 -0.59 1.95 1.54 1.99 -1.69 1.40 3.06
p-value 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.05 0.55 0.00
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Panel B: 2001 Sample
COMS CSCO DELL INTC MSFT QCOM SUNW All
Obs 221 8178 4819 8775 8750 7547 8219 46509
alpha
constant 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04
4.08 2.75 3.04 2.92 3.62 2.19 5.67 6.80
undercut -0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
-1.65 -4.44 2.71 -1.46 0.02 0.33 -0.77 -1.11
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-1.00 0.60 -1.25 0.99 -2.41 1.43 -2.05 -1.35
volat -0.75 0.35 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01
-0.67 2.48 -0.39 -0.65 -1.01 -1.29 -1.09 -0.77
theta
constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
-0.40 -0.31 0.04 -0.39 0.37 1.09 -1.62 0.50
undercut 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
1.77 4.68 -2.42 1.73 0.54 -0.10 1.16 1.39
depth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.34 -0.50 1.26 -1.00 2.26 -1.55 2.08 -0.13
volat 0.41 -0.18 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
0.70 -2.52 0.39 0.87 0.63 1.14 1.18 1.37
p-value 0.13 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.04
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Appendix: Additional statistical information
Comparing the Island and Nasdaq spreads Using the merged Island and Nasdaq dataset, we compared the
best Island bid quote and the best bid posted on Nasdaq by its competitors. 35.89% of the time the Island bid was
strictly higher than its Nasdaq counterpart, 43.16% of the time it was lower, and 20.94% of the time the two bid
quotes were equal. On the ask side, the best Island quote was better than that of its competitors 26.71% of the time,
it was higher 43.43% of the time, and the two quotes were equal 29.87% of the time.
These results are consistent with the findings by Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003), that ECNs often
establish the inside market. Our results differ from, and complement theirs because we analyze data on unrounded
Island quotes, downloaded from their site, rather than rounded quotes from the Nasdaq DQ file. Hence, we find
more frequent occurrences of the situation where Island beats the Nasdaq market makers quotes, and we document
undercutting by Island orders on a finer grid than the sixteenth grid.
The consequences of rounding To better document the impact of the rounding procedure on the quotes observed
on the Nasdaq system, we conducted the following experiment. Using the Island data for March 2000 (from the
NASTRAQ DQ file), we computed the mean spread on Island. It was equal to $59.26/256, which is greater than
its Island data counterpart, $50.70/256. This shows that the rounding procedure made the Island quotes much less
attractive than they were actually. This confirms our remark above that Island traders relied on other ticks than
sixteenths to quote to a large extent.
Synchronicity problems Since the Island quotes are incorporated in the Nastraq IQ quotes, the former can be
better than the latter only when they are on a finer price grid than the Nasdaq grid. This offers an opportunity to
assess the magnitude of the problems induced by synchronicity. When the best Island bid (resp. ask) is better than
the best Nasdaq bid (resp. ask), it should be on a finer tick than the Nasdaq grid. In our data this is the case for
DELL 84.60% (resp. 84.63%) of the time. This suggests that in 15% of the cases synchronicity problems induce
mistakes in our best quotes comparisons.
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